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A B S T R A C T 
From the 60s to the 90s, a great number of events related to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems Strainers 
have been happened in all kind of reactors all over the world. Thus, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
of the USA emitted some Bulletins to address the concerns about the adequacy of Emergency Core Cool-
ing Systems (ECCS) strainer performance at boiling water reactors (BWR). In Spain the regulatory body 
(Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, CSN) adopted the USA regulation and Cofrentes NPP installed new strain-
ers with a considerable bigger size than the old strainers. The nuclear industry conducted significant 
and extensive research, guidance development, testing, reviews, and hardware and procedure changes 
during the 90s to resolve the issues related to debris blockage of BWR strainers. In 2001 the NRC and 
CSN closed the Bulletins. Thereafter, the strainers issues were moved to the PWR reactors. In 2004 the 
NRC issued a Generic Letter (GL). It requested the resolution of several effects which were not noted in 
the past. The GL regarded to be resolved by the PWR reactors but the NRC in USA and the CSN in Spain 
have requested that the BWR reactors investigate differences between the methodologies used by the 
BWRs and PWRs. The developments and improvements done for Cofrentes NPP are detailed. Studies for 
this plant show that the head loss due to the considered debris is at most half of the limited head loss for 
the ECCS strainer and the NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) required for the ECCS pumps is at least three 
times lower than the NPSH available. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In the original regulation, Regulatory Guide 1.82 (NRC, 1974), 
the "50% blockage assumption" was raised. This assumption allows 
assuming that only half of the vertical screen area was available 
due to sump blockage in case of an accident. 
Subsequently, in 1979, the Unresolved Safety Issue A-43 was 
opened (NRC, 1979), to take into account problems such as vortex 
formation, debris blockage and ingestion of debris in pumps. The 
USI A-43 was close by the Generic Letter 85-22 (NRC, 1985), which 
was used to update the RG 1.82. 
From the 60s to the 90s, a great number of events related to 
the ECCS strainers had happened in a variety of reactors all over 
the world, being the most relevant Barseback (1992), Perry (1992, 
1993), Limerick (1995), Hart (2004) and (NRC, 1995b, 1996). 
In response to these events, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
of the USA (NRC) emitted Bulletins 95-02 and 96-03 to address 
these concerns at BWRs, as it was becoming a preoccupation for 
the Regulator (NRC, 1995). Bulletin 95-02 (NRC, 1995b), resulted 
in enhanced licensee measures to clean the suppression pools and 
establish foreign material control programs. Bulletin 96-03 (NRC, 
1996) instances to each BWR plant assessing its plant-specific situ-
ation regarding potential strainer clogging and recommended the 
installation of larger passive strainers. 
The strainer issues were evaluated very early in the Nordic 
countries (Hyvarinen, 1995). In conclusion, new designs were 
implemented in WER reactors in Finland (Mohsen, 1995) or PWR 
in Sweden (Henriksson and Schon, 1996; Trybom, 1996). 
To provide guidance to operators of BWRs for responding to 
these Bulletins, the BWR Owners' Group issued Licensing Topical 
Report NEDO-32686, rev.O in 1996 (BWROG, 1996). The most rele-
vant modification was that each plant installed significantly larger 
passive strainers (star, stacked disk or cassette type). 
The Spanish regulatory body (CSN) adopted the USA regulation 
to the Spanish plants, and Cofrentes installed new ECCS strainers 
with a considerable bigger size than the old ones (200 ft2 vs 17 ft2) 
in 1999. 
In 2001 the NRC closed the action on Bulletins 95-02 and 96-
03, publishing a report by Los Alamos National Laboratory with the 
lessons learned and the experimental test results (Rao et al., 2001). 
One year later the CSN close the action for the bulletins in Spain. 
Subsequently, the strainer matter requests were moved to the 
PWR reactors. In 1996 the NRC issued Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-
191 (NRC, 1996b), to examine whether the events and new research 
being conducted for the BWR strainers warranted similar activity 
at the PWR plants. 
In conclusion to all this previous work, the NRC issued the 
Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 in 2004 (NRC, 2004). This letter 
requested the resolution of several effects which were not noted in 
Bulletins 95-02 and 96-03 as the blockage of the recirculation flow 
downstream the strainer and the potential for chemical species to 
develop that could contribute to the debris load. 
In parallel, the German Reactor Safety Commission emitted the 
"Requirements for the demonstration of effective emergency core 
cooling during loss-of-coolant accidents with release of insula-
tion material and other substances" in July 2004 (Pointer et al., 
2008). Caused by that regulation, strainer size and modification 
of the insulation were implemented in the German plants. In the 
Taiwanese plant Maanshan NPP, started the evaluation on 2009, 
according to Cheng (2009). 
All the plant affected conducted several studies and design 
modifications to accomplish with the GL 2004-02. In 2009, the 
NRC published a communication paper summarizing the lessons 
learned from the strainer evaluation in light water reactors (NRC, 
2009). 
In the latest years, many research studies about the strainer 
blockage have been done. To calculate the ECCS pumps capacity 
and the influence of the debris blockage, extensive calculation have 
been performed, both analytical and with CFDs, see Grahn et al. 
(2008), Krepper et al. (2008, 2009, 2011), and Bahn et al. (2009, 
2011a,b). 
Some more research work has been done on the impact of the 
sump clogging during accidental conditions, see Sandrine et al. 
(2008) or Lee etal. (2011). 
1.2. Plant description 
Cofrentes Nuclear Power Plant is a Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR/6, Mark III Containment) designed and supplied by GE. The 
plant is inland, located 64 km far from the city of Valencia in the 
East of Spain and is owned by Iberdrola Generacion S.A. 
The plant was firstly connected to the national grid in 1984. 
At that time the thermal power of the plant was 2894 MWt. 
Fig. 1. Overview of Cofrentes NPP. 
After several upratings, the licensed power nowadays is 3237 MWt 
(111.85%). 
An overview of the plant is shown in Fig. 1. 
1.3. ECCS strainers description and design 
Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), low pressure core spray 
(LPCS) and high pressure core spray (HPCS) systems are used to 
inject water to the core in case of an emergency. The suctions of 
these systems are submerged in the suppression pool and have spe-
cial strainers which filter the water from the suppression pool. Each 
suction line has two independent strainers as it is shown in Fig. 2. 
The so-called "cassette" strainer was manufactured by CCI AG in 
Switzerland. The strainers are fully passive based on the following 
fundamental principles: 
• The integration of the largest possible effective suction area into 
the smallest possible strainer volume, in order to achieve very 
small flow velocities. 
• Modular design permitting different sizes of individual strainer 
units, as well as various combinations of strainer arrangements. 
With regard to this, Cofrentes has one strainer module smaller 
than the rest of the modules due to a mechanical restriction in 
the suppression pool and other plants have modules in row per 
suction line. 
• Installation of suction strainers with a maximum suction area 
and with a large safety margin, compatible with the load 
Fig. 2. ECCS strainer and its arrangement in the suppression pool. 
Fig. 3. ECCS module strainer. 
bearing capacity, of the respective ECCS connections (flanges, 
nozzles, etc.). 
The outer envelope of the strainer body is a jacket sheet with 
access windows leading to the inner structures as shown in Fig. 3. 
The internals have a large number of flow channel pockets which 
result in a very large effective suction area. The flange of the strain-
ers allows direct connection to the ECCS suction nozzle flange. The 
pocket design leads to favorable pass through conditions for the 
water flow. 
During a LOCA event, the suppression pool is highly turbulent. 
Debris from the containment, such as thermal isolation fibers, cor-
rosion products, paint chips, rust and dust is transported to the 
suppression pool. The head loss across the debris bed formed on 
the strainer surface is the most important part of the ECCS strainer 
design. Several tests were implemented in the U.S.A. and Europe to 
measure head loss across the debris beds. 
Consequently, several correlations were performed and col-
lected in NUREG/CR-6224 (Zigler et al., 1995). For Cofrentes NPP, 
the expression used for incompressible mixed beds and for the 
specific NUKON fiber data was the following (English units): 
15 AH = KT • [10(1 + 0.54??)1 3 • U + 4(1 + 0.54?])Uz]t (1) 
where AH is the Strainer head loss (ft water), Kj is the 0.299 (adi-
mensional) t is the theoretical thickness of fiber bed on the strainer 
(inch), j] is the Mc/Mf ratio, U is the approach water velocity to the 
strainer (ft/s), Mc is the mass of corrosion products (lb), and Mf is 
the mass of fibrous debris (lb). 
A list of considered debris for the design of the strainers at 
Cofrentes is shown in Table 1. 
The load of fiber in the strainer has great influence on its behav-
ior. As a consequence, the correlation should be modified according 
to three different cases: 
• Low fiber loading (LFL) case where the loading mass limit is 
mf< 0.14 lb/pocket. 
• Transition fiber loading (TFL) case where the loading mass limit 
is mf PS 0.14 up to 0.20 lb/pocket. 
• High fiber loading (HFL) case where the loading mass is 
mf> 0.20 lb/pocket. 
The HFL as conservative estimate was applied for the Cofrentes 
ECCS strainers. The equation is valid for water temperature 
rw = 7 1 ± l ° F but it can be adjusted proportionally to the water 
viscosity ratio. 
Furthermore, the effect of different miscellaneous debris such 
as paint chips, rust flakes, LOCA generated cement dust, inorganic 
zinc particles is considered in the head loss calculation by means 
of "Bump-up Factor" methodology. This factor is calculated by 
computing the head loss due to fiber, corrosion products and mis-
cellaneous debris at specified approach velocity divided by the head 
loss due to fiber and corrosion products alone, at the same approach 
velocity. Therefore the head loss from the miscellaneous debris is 
accounted for as a multiplicative factor which increases the total 
head loss. 
AH total AH, base Kbu (2) 
where Kbu = [Ahx(Mflber> Mcorrosion, Mrust, Mdust, .. .)]/[Ah0(Mflber, 
^corrosion. Mmst = 0, Mdust = 0,. • •)] potential issues related to ECCS 
strainer performance. 
1.4. BWR owners'group work 
Neither downstream effects nor chemical effects were noted in 
Bulletins 95-02 and 96-03. Significant improvements to PWR ECCS 
sump strainers have been made and final actions to close GL 2004-
02 are in currently progress. 
With GL 2004-02, the NRC requested that the boiling water reac-
tor owners' group (BWROG) investigate differences between the 
methodologies used by the BWRs and PWRs to address the effects 
of post-LOCAdebris on ECCS strainers, downstream equipment, and 
fuel. 
Iberdrola, the owner of Cofrentes NPP is part of the BWROG (USA 
and International BWRs) and has contributed to the resolution of 
these studies through the BWROG ECCS Strainer Committee. More 
than twenty BWR plants constitute the BWROG committee so the 
coordination of the work is very complex because each plant has 
their specifics and refueling outage schedules. 
The Committee is organized in four subcommittees: 
Table 1 
Strainer design criterion for Cofrentes NPP. 
Debris Amount Generation 
Fiber thermal insulator 
(Nukom) 
Metallic thermal insulator 
(RMI) 
Paintings 
Rust 
Dirt 
Unqualified paintings 
Corrosion products 
Rust 
Paintings 
200 ft3 (4801b) 
5685 ft2 
851b 
501b 
1501b 
12kg 
200.66 lb 
150.331b 
144.931b 
LOCA cofrentes invertory 
LOCA URG NEDO-32686 
Normal operation 
1. Downstream effects fuel DSE-F. 
2. Downstream effects components DSE-C. 
3. Source term. 
4. Headloss. 
The BWROG work began making preliminary studies. One of 
these preliminary studies was to establish the differences between 
the new PWR methodology in relation to the old BWR methodology. 
The study comprised three topics: 
• Regarding debris generation the most significant points are: 
PWR Pde 
struct could be lower than BWR Pdestmct. taking into 
account unqualified coatings outside the zone of influence (ZOI), 
providing basis for latent debris quantity, providing basis for rust, 
and dust quantities. 
• Regarding debris transport the most significant point is the dif-
ference among logic trees to determine the debris transport. 
• Regarding head loss testing and analysis the most significant 
point is the introduction of more accurate measurements during 
the tests. 
In case of the Cofrentes NPP during the design phase of the 
strainers a reasonable margin was considered because some con-
servatisms were introduced: 
• All thermal insulators in the dry well could go to the suppression 
pool in case of LOCA and they will be in the suppression pool at 
the initial moment of the event. 
• There was only one ZOI, the Dry Well. 
• The transporting factor considered was 1 while the methodology 
had considered 0.5. 
• A variety of residues went to the strainers. 
• The design took into account the manufacturer correlation (CCI) 
on behalf of the generic correlation (UGR). The correlation from 
the strainer manufacturer is more accurate than the URG because 
takes into account the specific characteristics of the plant. 
Another preliminary study established by the BWROG was to 
complete different walkdowns in the Dry Well and the Primary 
Containment to confirm the debris load considered in the strain-
ers design. There were four different walkdowns and their main 
characteristics were as follows: 
1. Insulation: To identify and document (type, location, quantity) 
insulation, other fibrous materials, latent debris, and temporary 
equipment left in containment that may present a challenge to 
the ECCS strainer. 
2. Coatings: To identify and document (type, quantity, condition) 
qualified and unqualified coatings that exist within the walk-
down areas. 
3. Latent debris: To collect dirt and dust debris samples. 
4. Reactive materials: To review plant documents in order to 
establish the potential materials that could affect post-LOCA 
chemistry. 
With regard to the walkdowns, Cofrentes NPP completed them 
during the refueling outage in 2009 and 2011 and the fuel cycle 
between them. The following measurements were performed: 
• A plan was established to substitute the NUKON thermal isola-
tion made of fibers with metallic thermal isolation. From 1999 to 
nowadays each refueling outage a portion of NUKON isolation is 
substituted although margin for this component is very high. 
• The suppression pool was cleaned, as shown in Fig. 4, and the 
frequency for this cleaning was updated. 
• Potential materials were detected in the Containment and Dry 
Well that could fall in the suppression pool so they were elimi-
nated or substituted to another qualified material. 
• The metallic thermal insulation was review. 
• The paintings were reviewed and repaired in some cases. 
• The personal safety signs, fire signage, and radiological labels 
were substituted with painted signs. 
• The identification of the equipment was substituted with quali-
fied metallic identifications. 
• The Foreign Material Exclusion procedure was updated. 
• Cabinets to collect the operational assistant papers were 
installed. 
Fig. 4. Suppression pool cleaning. 
• The Containment was cleaned with greater precision as shown in 
Fig. 5 in 2009 and 2010, During the refueling outage in 2011 the 
Dry Well was cleaned in the same way. 
• There is a plan to substitute plastic loudspeakers with metallic 
ones. 
• There is a plan to register the aluminum equipment. 
• There is a plan to qualify tags for the Dry Well. 
Furthermore, the BWROG performed a guideline which provides 
site engineering personnel with a means to evaluate conditions 
identified by the debris source term walkdowns in support of 
operability determinations. According to this, Cofrentes could suf-
ficiently ensure that their margins are totally enough taking into 
account the walkdowns performed. Studies performed to demon-
strate this fact showed the following considerations: 
• The collected debris during walkdowns was at most half of the 
limited debris calculated for the strainer. 
• The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) required for the pumps 
was at least three times lower than the NPSH available, as shown 
in Fig. 6. Fluid will only flow into the pump head by atmospheric 
pressure or atmospheric pressure plus a positive suction head. If 
suction pressure at suction pipe is below the vapor pressure of 
the fluid, the fluid may flash into a vapor. For satisfactory pump 
Fig. 5. Containment cleaning. 
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Fig. 6. NPSH required and available per each pump. 
operation under any set of conditions (capacity versus head) the 
NPSH, available, must be greater than the NPSH required. 
• The limited amount per each kind of debris was considerably 
higher than the current debris collected. 
The third preliminary study which is now in process will con-
sist of an ECCS strainer bypass test. The purpose of these bypass 
tests will be to determine the quantity and characteristics of fibrous 
debris that can potentially pass through the small holes of the per-
forated plate surface of the strainers in a post-LOCA environment. 
The bypass debris could affect downstream components like valves, 
heat exchangers or seals and/or accumulate in the reactor core and 
challenge the long term core cooling requirements following a loss 
of coolant accident (LOCA). 
For these tests, Cofrentes was in contact with the strainer manu-
facturer and could send a representative strainer to the designated 
facility at the request of the committee, if needed. 
This study was performed during 2012 for two different designs 
of strainers. As it was previously mentioned there are more than 
twenty BWR involved plants. It means that there are at least four 
different designs of strainers. To achieve representing results for 
every plant one strainer with complex geometry and another one 
with simple design was selected to the test. Several water approach 
velocities, types and concentrations of fibers were tested to achieve 
a general view of the performance of the strainer for all kind of 
circumstances. The BWROG is analyzing and compiling the results 
and it hopes to issue a final report during 2013. 
2.5. The twelve issues 
All of these studies are necessary to solve the main issues. The 
majority of them need the results of these preliminary studies to 
progress or these studies form an important part of the necessary 
work for each issue. 
Nowadays, the BWRs are studying 12 different points to resolve 
all the issues related to the ECCS strainer performance: 
1. Downstream effects for components and systems: 
Debris materials that pass through strainers might block very 
small openings in valves, pumps or other ECCS components so this 
point deals with the evaluation of this phenomenon. Furthermore, 
debris material that passes through strainers might produce erosive 
or abrasive wear of ECCS components. 
The objective of this point will be to demonstrate the good per-
formance of any BWR fuel with regard to the effect of downstream 
considered LOCA debris. These days this is one of the most impor-
tant issues so tests will begin in 2013. Fuel from the three vendors 
which has their fuel in BWR reactors will be tested. 
3. Debris head loss predictions: 
The treatment of different debris in the correlations could not 
have been conservative. The objective of this point will be to 
provide generic assessment of validity of existing plant correla-
tions. 
4. Chemical effects: 
The regulators require licensees to assess the impact of the 
chemical environment on the ability of the ECCS to provide long-
term core cooling so this point will focus on corrosion products, 
metallic components made of aluminum like microporous insula-
tion and concrete. 
5. Assessment of coatings: 
Non-qualified coatings inventories could be greater than the 
established so the introduction of assessment programs and 
address changes to the unqualified coatings inventory will be nec-
essary. 
6. Latent debris: 
Regulators noted that the BWR methodology assumed that 
latent debris was compounded solely of particles with a total Dry 
Well quantity of 150 lb. Now a requirement on the validation of this 
quantity and guidance on size characteristic is required. 
7. ZOI adjustment for air jet testing: 
Debris generation in the zones of influence (ZOI) is based on 
debris generation test conducted with air. Now there is a concern 
that steam may be more destructive than air so an increase in the 
size of the ZOIs could be required. 
8. ZOI for protective coatings: 
The BWR evaluation method could be not sufficiently conserva-
tive so more tests will be needed. 
9. Debris transport and erosion: 
The regulators noted differences between the PWR and BWR 
guidance which are necessary to evaluate. The objective of this 
point will be to develop a position paper confirming the validity 
of the BWR methodology. 
10. Debris characteristics: 
Potential blockage of calcium silicate insulation and other prob-
lematic materials such as microporous insulation could not have 
been conservatively treated. The objective of this point will be to 
identify acceptable debris characteristics for use in BWR strainer 
qualification analysis and testing. After that, plants could compare 
their analysis with the guidance document. 
2. Downstream effects - Fuel: 11. Near field effects and scaling: 
Settling of debris materials on test tank surfaces was noted in 
some PWR strainer test. As a consequence, assurance of any deposit 
material during tests is required for BWR plants. 
12. Spherical ZOI: 
Spherical ZOI could have maximized the quantity of debris but 
could not have selected the most problematic debris, such as micro-
porous or calcium silicate insulation. The objective of this point is 
to assess conservative spherical ZOI. 
2. Conclusion 
The work is very complex and it progress slowly. There are sev-
eral involved plants with very different refueling outage schedules 
and special characteristics. Furthermore, interaction with regula-
tors is very close and each result and point is agree on together. 
Cofrentes is cooperating with the BWROG to resolve all the 
issues. The studies are going to address the effects of post-LOCA 
debris on ECCS strainers, downstream equipment and fuel, resolve 
those differences and recalculate the safety margins of the strainers 
to ensure their performance. 
In case of Cofrentes, several conservative estimates were taken 
into account for the design of the strainers during the 90s. Head 
loss in the strainers and NPSH available in the pumps have a wide 
margin. In spite of this new phenomenon were not analyzed during 
the 90s. The BWROG has a plan to study every phenomena including 
real tests and a common solution will be issued for the fleet of BWR 
in the USA and for international members. As a result, Cofrentes 
continues to cooperate. 
Meanwhile the BWROG achieves final results for all these issues, 
Cofrentes updates their procedures to increase control about for-
eign materials in the Containment and Dry Well, maintains the 
cleanliness of these parts and the suppression pool, continues with 
plans to substitute NUKON isolation and establishes additional con-
trols for reactive materials in that buildings. 
New bigger ECCS strainers installed at Cofrentes in 1999 
together all these measurements are a warranty to maintain a great 
safety ECCS strainer performance in case of an emergency. 
